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The Central East European economies are competing for in-
ternational investment capital, especially for FDI in order to
support transformation. The paper explores how the Sie-
mens AG, one of the world's largest MNCs, allocates in-
vestments towards and within Central East Europe and how
they fit into its overall corporate strategy. They display stra-
tegic asset features, are targeted to cheap resources, meant to
serve either national or international markets and rely on
different degrees of functional integration (D21, F21, F23,
L22).I Introduction
Globalisation of markets and internationalization of production are among the
most salient features of world economic development during the last decades, es-
pecially since the early 1980s. As world-wide integration proceeds, traditional
trade links are increasingly supplemented by capital links. The main driving
forces behind this development are:
Growing competitive pressures to which enterprises, namely multinational
companies (MNCs), respond by optimizing their structure of production and
sales on a global scale. Besides undertaking trade, they are establishing
strategic alliances and co-operation schemes as well as initiating portfolio
and foreign direct investment.
A virtual renaissance of the market system as liberalization and transforma-
tion took hold of many former rather closed economies. Numerous countries
have liberalized their foreign economic regime, including policies towards
The research for this paper was undertaken with support from the European Commission's
Phare ACE Programme 1994 „Joint Ventures in Transformation Countries in the Context of
Overall Investment Strategies of Their Partners", project no. 92-0123-R.-2-
inward FDI, and over the past five years nearly all former socialist econo-
mies have abandoned central planning.
A considerable part of international capital linkages is constituted by means of
foreign direct investment (FDI), i.e. the acquisition of foreign assets with the in-
tention to control their use in production. Investors design their approach to FDI
such as to maximize the value added to be generated by combining foreign re-
sources with firm specific ones. As they are following different intentions four
types of FDI can be distinguished [Dunning 1995, p. 138]:
- Resource seeking FDI is meant to economize on the natural resource inputs
and/or labour cost;
market seeking FDI is meant to serve the market in which the foreign pro-
duction is established or to serve as a bridgehead for entering other markets;
efficiency seeking FDI is meant to realize productivity gains by implement-
ing advanced — lean, flexible, integrated — concepts of production;
Many countries also have abandoned tariffs and other trade barriers. With respect to FDI,
liberalisation and deregulation work in the opposite direction as they discourage foreign
production as a vehicle to enter trade protected markets. Deregulation makes markets work
more efficient and may regain them an edge relative to co-ordination via intra-firm hierar-
chies.-3-
strategic asset seeking FDI is meant to set the stage for long term competi-
tiveness, namely to underpin existing or to create new competitive advan-
tages.
MNCs can pursue different strategies to establish functional links between corpo-
rate and affiliate activities [UNCTAD 1993, p. 118ff.]. In stand-alone strategies,
the parent company mostly concentrates on acquiring ownership, providing fi-
nance and/or transferring technology while the affiliate is performing along the
other parts value chain and is able to operate largely independently within the
host economy. Tn simple integration strategies affiliates' activities in the host
country are linked to and dependent on the parent company's activities in the
home country. Mostly, affiliates cover only a smaller part of the value chain such
that they would not be able to stand alone. The parent company closely controls
the affiliate and remains with most of the corporate functions. Outsourced interna-
tional production typically represents simple integration strategies. In complex in-
tegration strategies any affiliate may perform functions for the company as a
whole. Functional activities — not only manufacturing but similarly research and
development, procurement, finance, accounting, staff training, legal activities and
corporate planning — are located wherever they can be performed best.-4-
Corporate strategies of international integration have a regional dimension, too
[UNCTAD 1993, p. 128ff.]. In multi-country strategies each affiliate primarily
serves its host country market while the parent company controls several affiliates
in different countries. In regional strategies affiliates are located in various host
countries within a certain region and the major market for their product is this re-
gion. Often affiliates are co-operating and establishing networks with non-affiliat-
ed companies acting as local suppliers and subcontractors. In global strategies af-
filiates are similarly located within a certain region and similarly may establish re-
lations to non-affiliated companies but primarily they are producing to serve glo-
bal markets.
The transforming economies of Central East Europe have a vital interest in inte-
grating into the world economy with respect to both trade relations and capital
links. They consider the inflow of foreign capital to be crucially important to pro-
mote enterprise restructuring triggered by transformation and to firmly root the
newly established market system. More specifically, they expect foreign investors
to generate income and employment. Without neglecting transformation specific
obstacles and notwithstanding individual countries' profile of comparative advan-
tages the former socialist economies in Central East Europe are offering interna-
tional investors-5-
- a large industrial base,
a well qualified labour force at relatively low cost,
- a sizeable domestic market with pent-up demand for both consumer and in-
vestment goods,
a favourable regulatory framework in terms of taxes as well as environment-
al or social norms and
- proximity to the European Union.
Large MNCs are playing a leading role in the process of globalization — in trad-
ing as well as in allocating capital, moving human resources and installing new
technologies. According to UNCTAD, the world's largest hundred MNCs, rank-
ed by foreign assets, control about one-third of the world FDI stock [UNCTAD
1994, p. xxi]. This paper examines how one of them — Siemens AG is ranking
number 17 [UNCTAD 1994, p. 6] — proceeds in order to reach the best possible
match between the company's strengths and a specific region's locational pro-
file. First, the paper considers the historical and global context of Siemens' inter-
Further studies in this field refer to theoretical consideration and empirical assessment [San-
der 1992; Sander, Schmidt 1993; Schmidt 1994; Schmidt 1995] as well as to the case of
Volkswagen AG [Sander 1994].-6-
national activities. Then it gives attention to the company's activities in Central
East Europe. It sketches the general features with respect to this region, looks at
the country-specific activities and describes how enterprise restructuring is car-
ried through. Finally, it draws conclusions on how this company's approach to
FDI appears in the general context of globalization and internationalization.
II Foreign Activities — The Historical and Global Context
• The Siemens group with its core business in electrical and electronics is a
typical multinational enterprise. It is represented in more than 150 countries
on all five continents and employs some 380 000 people. Presently, about
60 percent of its global business are generated outside of Germany. Since
the beginning of political and economic liberalisation Central Eastern Eu-
rope again represents a region of special interest in the group's international
strategy. Siemens' international activities are dating back into the last cen-
tury. In 1851 — only four years after its foundation in 1847 — the company
started to operate abroad. The first basis of its international activities was in
eastern Europe, in Russia. Delivering some dozen telegraph devices and
building a telegraph line linking the Baltic Ocean with the Black Sea estab-
lished Siemens as one of the first players on the international market scene.
In 1855 Siemens opened its first foreign branch office in St. Petersburg and-7-
since then international activities based on presence in foreign countries
have been an integral part of Siemens' overall investment and business strat-
egy. • - " -•:-•
Word War II cut off most of the economic links to eastern Europe the com-
pany had developed so far. However, the network of business relations has
already been as dense as to facilitate new beginnings after abolishment of
the iron curtain. Several decades of socialist planning have left public infra-
structure and communication systems in eastern Europe in a deplorable
state. They prove to be most serious bottlenecks in establishing market
structures. Public infrastructure and telecommunications constitute corner
stones of economic development and transformation on the one hand and
offer promising business opportunities on the other hand. Hence easterners
and westerners equally have strong interest in joint undertakings. Usually
expectations are running high on both sides and often only large western in-
vestors are considered competent and strong enough to tackle the enormous
tasks which go along with market creation and knowledge transfer. Siemens
has taken this challenge and built up a considerable commitment to the
economies of Central East Europe.
A first resurgence occurred in the political thaw period of the early 1970s.In continuing what begun in the late 19th century Siemens pursues a com-
prehensive global strategy. Local co-operative ventures, technology transfer
and world-market manufacturing with transregional marketing concepts are
of high importance. Usually, the early stage of a market is considered the
optimal point of time to establish the company's presence [Siemens 1994,
p. 21]. The main strategic devices are first, expanding sales, i.e. growing via
trade links and second, expanding foreign direct investment, i.e. growing via
equity links. With respect to sales Siemens strives for expansion wherever it
can possibly capture market share. With respect to foreign direct investment
Siemens basically watches the entire global market place for opportunities to
allocate its commitments.
All international activities of Siemens are instrumental to the company's
general growth target, namely the aspiration to grow faster than the respec-
tive market. For all activities strategic goals are defined by competitive
bench-marking, either referring to the growth of the respective market seg-
ment or measuring a division's expansion against the growth of the whole
company. It is this very growth orientation which makes Siemens look for
strong partners in its international activities, mostly choosing them among
national market leaders.-9-
Among the regions of the world, present growth leader is South East Asia,
while future growth performance is expected to characterize Central East
Europe which is actually considered as a region of emerging markets. Yet
growth market orientation leaves unaffected the group's commitment to its
already well established businesses in other regions. Rather, new growth
oriented businesses are considered to be supplementary to those which have
been developed earlier on and consolidated then: in South America in the
1960s, in North America and in India in the 1970s. As a result, the group ap-
pears to be firmly based on its German and Western European home mar-
kets while at the same time "explicitly committing to both present and future
growth markets.
According to its philosophy and corporate identity Siemens considers inter-
national activities from a long-term perspective. In exploring foreign markets
it relies on a deliberately designed developmental approach. Aiming to op-
timize both trade flows and production structures it permanently looks for
growing markets and favourable locations. In the past, Siemens used to start
in emerging markets with small scale operations and a low degree of com-
mitment which was to be increased according to the market development.
This is in sharp contrast to the Japanese strategy of ,,laser beaming". Japanese investors
usually wait until a market has reached a certain degree of maturation. Then they make a
huge, powerful attempt to capture it and to take a leading position.- 10-
Siemens used to establish a first foothold by founding joint venture compa-
nies in which it held a minority share and which later on was to be trans-
formed into a majority holding. Nowadays, in order to speed up settlements
in the new markets of South East Asia and Central East Europe Siemens has
revised its strategy and mainly relies on acquiring companies for production
and establishing sales and services organisations. In mature markets acquir-
ing existing companies or founding subsidiaries typically prevails.
The Siemens AG encompasses 16 product groups and two separate legal
units which all are operated under the guidance of the Siemens AG manag-
ing board (Chart 1). Product groups are organized as profit centers and
managed nearly like individual companies. This entails that each group is re-
sponsible both to design and implement its own global strategy according to
the specific features of its markets. Usually, several groups are developing
activities in a certain country. This entails that group specific strategies have
to be co-ordinated on the company level. The corporate executive committee
has to approve each foreign investment and to consolidate individual group
activities so as to ensure that in each country or region Siemens as a whole
6
Beyond the public limited company (AG), Siemens further accounts for five German
subsidiaries, 56 international subsidiaries, three German and three internationally associated
companies and numerous joint ventures in different countries [Siemens 1994c, pp. 58, 59],
For illustration see Appendix.-11 -
proceeds with a consistent strategy. Within a certain country, co-ordination
of Siemens' multiple activities is achieved by a key-account manager. In the
national framework, he is in charge of representing the company as a whole,
especially in negotiations with large customers. Each country concept — on
the individual group level as well as on the overall company level — is
scheduled for fundamental scrutiny every three to five years. This serves to
check group concepts against market developments, especially to explore
new opportunities and to re-adjust co-ordination on the company level. The
main issue of co-ordination is to realize synergies with respect to peripheral
resources and services, i.e. to pool those resources and services which are
not specific to group production but which can best be rendered on the com-
pany level, like sales distribution or research and development.-12-
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Siemens' basic guideline for international activities is to rely on locally gen-
erated value added, irrespectively of regions' and businesses' peculiarities.
In a foreign country Siemens generally pursues two kinds of activities, one is
targeting the host country market, the other is targeting the international
market. Targeting host country markets mainly represents a multi-country
approach in which functional linkages between parent and affiliate are usual-
ly established by stand-alone arrangements or by simple integration. Target-
ing international markets essentially represents a global approach in which
functional linkages may be established by stand-alone arrangements as well
as by simple or complex integration.
Activities assigned to the local market usually comprise assembly of parts,
marketing activities and projects in public infrastructure. They are mainly in-
itiated to participate in emerging markets from the very beginning, they often
rely on orders by state organizations submitted by public tender, they are
mainly pursued by newly founded companies or joint ventures and — on
purpose to secure employment — they are often carried out by subcontract-
ing with local companies. As far as inputs like technological and market
know-how are required, they have to be provided by Siemens as the western
investor.":?'•*••.-,_-. +.-»•
In contrast, activities targeting at international markets, i.e. export markets,
usually comprise large-scale production and are initiated to realize wage
cost advantages and economies of scale. Mostly, they are set up by acquir-
ing an existing company, thus relying on technologies which are already
available in the host country. Siemens as the western investor in the first in-
stance has to transfer the know-how needed for restructuring and moderniza-
tion and to provide finance.
The relative importance of targeting local resp. international markets is de-
termined first, by the relative size of a country's domestic market and sec-
ond, by the level of a country's economic development. The share of pro-
duction for international markets tends to be the higher, the smaller the do-
mestic market of the foreign country and the higher its level of economic de-
velopment. Thus, in the east European transformation countries, the share of
production for international markets in Siemens' activities tends to be higher
than in South East Asia where domestic markets are relatively large.
The degree of market development determines both kind and intensity of
Siemens' commitment towards a region. In the global context, Siemens dis-
tinguishes three types of regions. First, regions where Siemens' market pres-
ence is well established like Germany, Western Europe, North and South-15-
America; second, regions which are currently realizing their growth potential
and display high dynamics like South East Asia and third, regions where
markets are only emerging but promise considerable future growth like
Central Eastern Europe. Generally, established markets account for the larg-
est stock of equity and absorb the largest part of flows while emerging mar-
kets only play a minor role both with respect to stocks and flows.
• Global presence and growth are not considered as a purpose on their own
but as means to cope with global competitive pressure. Maintaining one's
competitive position requires a permanent process of optimization and reor-
ganization: production processes have to be restructured, production sites
have to be relocated, existing products have to be adapted to changing mar-
ket requirements and new products have to be developed. As far as possible,
Siemens intends to maintain the competitiveness of existing productions by
improving processes and enhancing product quality. Only when the potential
for improvements on the spot is exhausted, production will be switched to
another, more favourable location or will possibly be discontinued. Siemens
responds to competitive pressures by letting locational competition work
also among its own companies, especially among those committed to inter-
national production.-16-
Similar to investments in South East Asia, Siemens' commitment to the for-
mer socialist economies is motivated by growth perspectives. The process of
transition from plan to market may be long and stony but it unequivocally
sets the stage for future growth dynamics and is considered the very proper
time to establish a firm foothold. The activities Siemens displays in eastern
Germany, e.g., can be seen as a blueprint for its approach to Central East
Europe: once confronted with enlarged national markets due to unification
Siemens defined its target for eastern Germany as to reach a market position
similar to that in western Germany. Promising fields of activity were identi-
fied both in modernizing infrastructure and in enterprise restructuring. In
eastern Germany, even before unification was realized, Siemens started out
with establishing comprehensive sales and service networks which were
characterized by proximity to markets and high content of local value added.
Later on, the scope of activities was enlarged so as to include assembly lines
and licensed production. Siemens established joint ventures or subsidiaries,
and entered co-operations concerning licensed production of data process-
ing. Also, it participated in the privatization process acquiring businesses in
communication, automation and automotive systems. Siemens contributes to
Although Siemens does not ,,anticipate a substantial expansion of business over the near and
medium term" [Siemens 1994a, p. 8] it intends to at least double its international market
share in Central and Eastern Europe over the medium term [Siemens 1994c, p. 5].
Siemens 1990, p. 7.-17-
its partnerships in terms of injecting capital, transferring technology and fa-
cilitating world market entry.
• On the whole, Siemens considers its global activities to be very successful.
As a rule, Siemens proceeds from the presumption that — guaranteed by its
experience and competence — each investment will be profitable. Within a
period of normally three, eventually five years each new venture is sched-
uled to pass the break-even point and to start generating returns. Basically,
divestitures are not part of Siemens' global strategy. Anyway, there is a ba-
sic asymmetry between existing, potentially declining activities and those
which are to be set up newly: for social reasons it is much harder to discon-
tinue any activity, even if unprofitable, than to identify new market oppor-
tunities and to set up new ventures.
Ill Activities in Central East Europe
Siemens' Approach to Central East Europe
• Since the fall of the iron curtain Siemens has continuously intensified its ac-
tivities in Central East Europe and meanwhile has build up a considerable
commitment. The transitional period of economic transformation from plan
to market is considered the best time to establish a firm foothold in the re--18-
gion. Initiating activities in emerging markets is reflecting Siemens' long-
term approach to international investment. They serve to acquire intimate
knowledge of the economic framework there in order to tap future growth
potentials. According to reform progress Siemens identifies different groups
of transformation countries. Siemens' interest centres in the so-called core
countries Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland where reforms started
early and already yielded tangible results. The core countries are followed
by Slovakia and Slovenia, and these five together constitute the group of
reform countries. In contrast, Russia and the other successor states of the
Soviet Union are considered as cases of their own as their commitment to
market oriented reforms is much weaker and their markets are assessed to
be much riskier than those in the reform countries."
Presently, Siemens participates in about 70 enterprises in Central East
Europe and employs more than 22 000 people there. According to the size
of the equity share Siemens holds a commitment is considered either as joint
10
Central East Europe is conceived as additionally including the Baltic Republics, Bulgaria,
Romania and Albania.
In power generation Siemens has established several joint ventures in Russia. To the
Ukrainian government Siemens has presented a concept to switch off the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant and to build a center for closing down and disposing of outdated nuclear
installations [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1995].
In east Germany Siemens employs about 18 000 people. Figures in this paragraph refer to
April 1995.-19-
venture (equity share of Siemens below 50 p.c.) or as majority holding
(equity share of Siemens above 50 p.c.). According to employment, majority
holdings (16 600 people) account for a considerably higher share than joint
ventures (5 400 people). The regional distribution of employment nearly
replicates the pattern of equity involvement. While the three core countries
account for a workforce of about 15 500 people (3 200 in Poland, 4 100 in
Hungary and 8 200 in the Czech Republic) the two other reform countries
account for about 3 000 people. This indicates that Siemens allocates both
capital and labour according to reform commitment and reform results.
• Siemens displays its activities in Central East Europe both in the public and
in the private sector. Businesses are developed primarily in four fields:
- medical systems and automation,
power generation, transmission and distribution, mainly upgrading nu-
clear facilities,
- telecommunication systems with both communication networks and in-
formation systems, and
transportation and automotive systems.-20-
Furthermore, a wholesale network in electrical installations — which rests
upon so-called installation centers covering the full line of electrical supplies
and a complete range of services — has been set up and shall be expanded
further. A large part of businesses, namely in power generation, telecom-
munication and railway systems, rests upon public orders.
Projects in the public sector usually benefit to a certain degree from public
finance which may come from national authorities as well as from interna-
tional financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the Euro-
pean Bank for Regional Development or the European Investment Bank.
Then Siemens' main tasks are to transfer know-how and to assume manage-
ment responsibility. However, if funds from international sources are not
available, finance proves to be a serious bottleneck to many projects. In the
private sector, anyway, Siemens is the partner mainly responsible for provid-
ing finance.
In every country the settlement of activities exhibits a certain locational pat-
tern according to the kind of production and its target markets. Service and
marketing units are usually centred in the capital cities while production and
assembly lines are mostly located peripherally to the center. In contrast,
large production entities in charge of serving export markets are located-21-
where production costs are the lowest, i.e. far from the capital center in the
country side. Often they are established at traditional production sites.
• Besides trading, tliere are two main modes to enter an emerging market. The
first is to set up new ventures by founding 100 percent subsidiary compa-
nies, the second is to start co-operation with existing local companies by ac-
quiring part of their equity. In the strategy of Siemens, founding new com-
panies mainly serves to attend the national market, especially to win orders
for projects in public infrastructure which are submitted by public tender. In
such tenders the required performance — in terms of services to be rendered
and goods to be delivered — is usually fixed and the crucial parameter to
win the bid is the price at which the required performance is offered. Addi-
tionally and as a device to reduce unemployment public bodies tend to im-
pose the obligation to subcontract primarily with domestic companies. Such
newly founded subsidiaries heavily rely on the know-how transferred by the
mother company while co-operations — irrespective of minority or majority
holdings — mainly benefit from combining existing local know-how — up-
graded by the western partner — with low local labour costs. This makes
them internationally competitive and allows them to build up large-scale ex-
port oriented productions. Yet such ventures will only succeed if the western-22-
partners masters the intricate task to restructure an organization which for-
merly was a socialist enterprise,
• Establishing joint ventures or majority holdings with local enterprises is pre-
ceded by a complex process of information, negotiation and contract design.
In the reform countries interest in co-operation with western enterprises is
generally very high and the eastern market for mergers and acquisitions
seems to be a buyer's market. For western investors like Siemens preparing
the choice often requires a comprehensive process of gathering information,
. filtering and sorting out the many proposals submitted by local enterprises.
Main source of information is the potential partner company itself. Public
bodies like national property funds or ministries are only involved as far as
privatization is concerned. The choice Siemens finally makes is based on as-
sessing the company's know-how, its production profile and its market pro-
spects. Once a partner has been chosen the terms of the contract have to be
negotiated. Easterners prove to be very tough in negotiating and sometimes
it appears to be quite difficult or even impossible to achieve mutual under-
standing, like in the case of Skoda, Pilzen. Between Siemens and a future
partner basically all aspects of the acquisition itself and the design of the
partnership are negotiable and have to be fixed by contract: consensus has to
be reached on the purchasing price for the operational unit as well as on the-23-
price for real estate, on the investment volume, on management responsibil-
ity, on employment, wages, old debts and on coverage for possible losses.
• In fixing the terms of acquisition and co-operation Siemens attempts to make
a clean cut with the past and to set the conditions for a new start. From its
perspective the best deal is to shed off old debts — both financial and eco-
logical — and to acquire only productive assets (fixed and current assets,
necessary real estate) and resources, namely staff people which incorporate
the company's future potential. Only in second preference, Siemens is ready
to accept price reduction for taking over old debts or redundant staff. With
respect to operating results each venture is meant to be both independent
and responsible: independent as how to use profits and responsible for cov-
ering losses. Only during the take-off period of usually three, maximally five
years Siemens AG as the mother company is willing to take over losses.
Siemens' Activities in Individual Countries
• Siemens has defined some basic rules which constitute the group's corporate
strategy towards international business. Although they are valid for all mar-
kets, countries and operations, Siemens' approach towards each specific
country or region takes a different shape according to the level of economic-24-
development, the length and history of economic relations and the number
and kind of markets in which Siemens intends to set up businesses.
• In Hungary, Siemens entered the market place in 1890 when opening an of-
fice there which took part in building and installing the underpavement train
in Budapest which at that time was the first in Europe. This as a starting
point Siemens continued to develop businesses in Hungary mainly in the
agglomeration area of the capital city. Near Budapest Siemens established a
cable, a motor and a transformer factory as well as low-voltage production
facilities for radio equipment and other products. By the end of World
War II Siemens' staff in Hungary had grown to more than 2 000 people.
' Although under communism business contacts were reduced to a minimum
they never ceased completely. At the end of the 1960s they were revitalized
as Hungarians — for reasons of know-how and the historical record of rela-
tions — opted to co-operate with Siemens when installing the first computer
mainframe in Hungary. In 1974 Siemens established a sales and service joint
venture which at that time was the only co-operative venture between an
eastern state trading company and a privately held West German company.
At the end of the 1980s Siemens realized a sales volume of 100 million DM-25-
in Hungary and today it is the leading electrical engineering company with
annual sales of about 500 million DM sales and about 4 100 employees.
• Over the course of time Siemens has built up a considerable number of quite
independent, relatively small business units. At the beginning of the 1990s,
Siemens set out to restructure them, moulding them into one larger unit, and
made this new body responsible for most of the business activities in Hun-
gary, namely to satisfy all customer demands — consultation, installation,
service — from one single source. Two other big production companies
— one for telecommunication, the other for cable activities — are producing
for the national market, the latter for the international market, too. Siemens
is optimistic about the dynamic development in Hungary to continue and un-
derscores its commitment with investing about 300 million DM into renewal
and expansion of its local ventures.
o In Poland, Siemens results to be the biggest German investor although only
ranking 22nd if compared internationally. Siemens entered the Polish market
in the 1950s with operations in medical engineering and now leads the na-
tional market in this field. Furthermore, Siemens made large commitments to
Poland in public communications with establishing its only manufacturing
facility in the country. In 1991 Siemens GmbH, Warsaw, was founded for-26-
the purpose of sales, service, installation and administration. Nowadays, it
represents the entire scope of Siemens' operations in Poland.' Employment
in this company increased from 20 people in 1991 to 210 in 1994, sales
lately reached a volume of annually 200 million DM and the installed vol-
ume of medical devices accounts for a volume of 450 million DM. Six
branch offices in major cities (Gdansk, Posnan, Breslau, Kattovice, Krakow
and Lodz) constitute a comprehensive network for sales and service activi-
ties. In 1993, when acquiring the Polish ZWUT telephone factory, Siemens
had to agree to a package deal and had to acquire the Elwro computer parts
maker, too. Actually, with approximately 1 100 people ZWUT accounts for
the largest volume of employment under the roof of Siemens in Poland; El-
wro employs some 200 people.
• In Poland, sales and services which are related to medical engineering seem
to develop fairly well, while acquiring orders in other areas, e.g. automation
technology, private communication systems or semiconductors apparently
takes a much greater deal of effort. Beyond these activities Siemens is in-
volved in installing or upgrading environmental and control technology, in
building components for Polish television manufacturers and in supplying
13
Except private communication networks.-27-
sinumerik control devices for Polish machine tool makers. Technologically
advanced supplies such as those delivered by Siemens enable Polish manu-
facturers to compete successfully both in the national and international mar-
ket place.
• In Czechoslovakia, Siemens entered the market place already in the late
19th century. In 1890, Prague and Brunn were home to Siemens representa-
tive offices. By 1919, Siemens had integrated Prague into the European
rapid telegraph network. Until World War II Siemens expanded its presence
in the country running a considerable number of production sites and sales
offices, finally employing some 1 500 people. Today, Siemens' activities in
the Czech Republic comprise some 8 200 employees in about 12 companies
and joint ventures. This represents Siemens' largest commitment in Eastern
Europe.
• When re-entering Czechoslovakia in the post-communist period Siemens
could continue to work on the industrial structure which had been developed
so far. In the Czech Republic Siemens displays production activities mainly
in the fields of telecommunications equipment, automotive electrical sys-
tems, electromechanical components, drives and standard products. Sie-
mens' sales activities in the Czech Republic are co-ordinated by Sie--28-
mens s.r.o., Prague, founded in 1994 and presently working with some
100 employees. Sales and service activities on the Czech market mainly
comprise medical systems, automation, power transmission and transporta-
tion systems.
Referring to production Siemens has established several prominent projects.
One of the early co-operations was with Tesla Karlin, the largest Czech
manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. In March 1991, Siemens
and Tesla Karlin founded the Tescom joint venture: Siemens took a minority
share but was already planning to make Tescom a wholly-owned Siemens
subsidiary. Tescom succeeded in winning important public customers: first,
the Czech as well as the Slovak government commissioned Tescom to ex-
pand the telephone network relying on Siemens EWSD switching systems
and second, the Czech SPT Telecom repeatedly commissioned Siemens to
install subscriber lines. At the end of 1994, Siemens raised its equity share
to 100 percent and Tescom was renamed in Siemens Telekomunikace.
In 1992, Siemens acquired the former state enterprise ZPA, Trutnov, with
650 employees and made it a wholly-owned subsidiary. ZPA produces elec-
tromechanical components and under the auspices of Siemens production
and sales took a considerable upswing. Sales were doubled with the acqui--29-
sition alone and tripled again within the first year. Production was converted
from labour-intensive relay production to semi and fully automated proc-
esses. The key to success has been the restructuring process initiated by the
new owner: adopting the principles of continuous improvement ZPA sought
to qualify according to the ISO 9002 standard and achieved this goal already
in May 1993 — even seven months earlier than initially scheduled.
• In September 1994, the Siemens group Drives and Standard Products ac-
quired three plants for producing industrial engines from the Czech state
manufacturer MEZ (Moravske Elektrotechnicke Zavody). In October 1994,
all three production sites were integrated into the newly founded Siemens
Elekrromotory s.r.o., employing some 5 000 people and reporting annual
sales of about 150 million DM. Siemens negotiated a sales price of 78 mil-
lion DM for the three companies, agreed to invest about 80 million DM in
the five years to come and promised to continue employment approximately
on the given level. Siemens felt motivated to this acquisition as the produc-
tion facilities appeared quite suitable to complement Siemens' product range
of drives and standard products and as the technological level was so high
that it would have made them serious competitors, at least with respect to
product quality. Major shortcomings, though, have been identified with re-
spect to productivity and sales distribution. To remove them, the companies-30-
are subject to internal restructuring as well as to improving distribution both
by establishing sales networks for their own products and by integrating
them into the sales network for Siemens' products.
In the beginning of its activities in the transformation economies of eastern
Europe, Siemens has been intending to establish a joint venture with Skoda,
Pilsen, the largest Czech plant and equipment maker and to develop it into
the main pillar of its operations in Central East Europe. Siemens and Skoda
negotiated for setting up two joint ventures: one for transportation systems,
the other to operate a power plant. To the latter, Siemens was motivated as
the plant was located quite closely to the customers and enjoyed a favour-
able cost structure, mainly thanks to low labour costs. Negotiations with
Skoda consumed a lot of time and manpower and induced Siemens to
transfer some important know-how in advance. Nevertheless, they finally
•''•failed. The Czechs have gained the reputation to be utmost tough negotiators
and, possibly, in the case of Skoda they went too far. Confronted with ever
higher demands Siemens finally decided to'abstain from the whole project,
writing off the costs of negotiation. Although these direct costs have obvi-
ously been considerable, opportunity costs must have been at least equally
important: for the duration of the negotiations Siemens was bound to Skoda-31-
and had to refrain from initiating alternative projects while its competitors
have been free to develop their activities.
Siemens' Approach to Enterprise Restructuring
• Acquiring equity stakes in formerly socialist enterprises entails the task to
fundamentally restructure the entire scope of operations. In this, Siemens
usually gives priority to setting up or improving distributional networks as
market presence is key to any success, for consolidation as well as for future
growth. Internal tasks are ranking next: first enhancing product quality and
adapting the product range, then raising efficiency of production via both
modernizing physical capital, i.e. investing, and upgrading human capital by
education and training.
• In adapting an enterprise's products and production processes Siemens ap-
plies a so-called zebra-approach which basically represents a gradual con-
cept of restructuring and modernization. Given that at the beginning of re-
structuring the whole production unit runs a set of identical, old and cost-in-
tensive machines with which it produces one single product A. Then it may
be favourable to release part of the machines from producing the old prod-
uct A and use them to produce other products B and C. Each production line-32-
or ,,stripe" of machines is vertically defined and able to produce pieces of
final output. Thus the enterprise offers a greater range of products which
makes it less vulnerable to changes in demand as it can swiftly change
among the different lines of production. Besides restructuring the production
program, the zebra-approach is similarly applied to ,,stripewise" restructur-
ing the production process, i.e. to gradually modernize the machinery.
The approach Siemens applies to management training in its eastern Euro-
pean ventures basically relies on job sharing. German expatriates are dele-
gated and entrusted with tutoring local employees to the most important jobs
of the middle management. Each of the respective jobs is filled with both a
German and a national. They are working jointly in this job for a certain pe-
riod of time. In the first stage, the tutor assumes the major, his national part-
ner a minor share of tasks and responsibility (Chart 2). As learning effects
materialize the assignment of responsibility between the two partners is
shifted so as to reduce the role of the German and to increase the role of the
national manager. Finally, the national manager assumes full responsibility
while the German withdraws completely from the job. Only in the top man-
agement are jobs permanently filled with German expatriates.-33-
Chart 2 - Management Training in Siemens' Foreign Subsidiaries
early stage: lower degree of later stage: higher degree of
responsibility for the local manager responsibility for the local manager
The availability of skilled local labour at relatively low wages — in the
Czech Republic, e.g., a worker's manhour only costs 2 or 3 DM on aver-
age — is one of the important advantages with which the transforming
economies of eastern Europe are competing for international investment
capital. Plowever, employment matters are strongly interwoven with social
concerns. Employment policies represent a potential field of conflict be-
tween a western investor and his local joint venture partner as enterprise re-
structuring often entails workforce reduction and mostly comes along with
increased requirements to working effort and discipline. Apparently, Sie-
mens is quite successful in reconciling efficiency requirements with social
concerns. With implementing modern working time schedules, e.g. four-shift
operations, which allow to increase capacity utilization without extending
personal working time, paying wages above national average, offering social-34-
benefits and providing a modern working environment, Siemens has ac-
quired the reputation of both a technologically and socially competent part-
ner.
IV Summary and Conclusions
Siemens has a long historical record in international activities, dating back to the
19th century. After the fall of the iron curtain and the re-opening of the Central
East European economies Siemens revived and intensified its activities in this re-
gion and initiated a considerable number of ventures. They are inspired by growth
orientation, based on long-term commitment and guided by the principle of creat-
ing local value added. They are based on a multi-country or an overall global ap-
proach and employ different modes of functional integration. Either way is meant
to fully include the region into Siemens' global network of activities. Presently, it
appears too early for a final evaluation as most undertakings are still in their pe-
riod of probation. Results reported so far indicate that the approach Siemens ap-
plies to international activities will work out in Central East Europe, too. The
funds assigned to further investment in the region do confirm this assessment.-35-
Appendix
International Activities of Osram GmbH
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• Osram GmbH is a wholly-owned Siemens affiliate. It was founded in Berlin
in 1919 by three German firms — AEG, Siemens and Halske AG, Deutsche
Gasgluhlicht AG — which merged their production of incandescent lamps.
Today, next to Philips and General Electric, Osram belongs to the world's
top three manufacturers of lamps and operates on a global scale. It employs
about 27 000 people world-wide and has associated companies, sales offices
and local representatives in 80 countries, thereof 45 production plants lo-
cated in 15 countries. In 1993/94 international markets accounted for 85 per-
cent of all sales. This share shall be increased further to 90 or 95 percent in
the years to come. Osram's home market base comprises both Europe and
the US. Asia results to be important for its growth market potential and
Eastern Europe is considered as a favourable low-cost production place.
• Osram's investment strategy assigns a major role to the US. Commitments
there are considered crucially important to any international success. In
1994, Osram invested roughly 1 bill. DM to acquire Sylvania, a US lamp
1
4 Siemens 1994a; Siemens 1994c; Handelsblatt 1994a, 1994b.-36-
manufacturer, and merged it with Osram North America into Osram Sylva-
nia Inc. (OSI). This deal allowed Osram to considerably lift both sales and
profits — which are said to have been nearly doubling from 3 bill. DM in
1992/93 to around 5.5 bill. DM in 1993/94 resp. from 180 mill. DM to some
360 mill. DM — and put the company on equal footing with its main com-
petitors Philips and General Electric. Sylvania was in urgent need of restruc-
turing but nevertheless offered promising perspectives, namely the huge po-
tential of the internal US-market and considerable synergies with Osram
from sharing overhead facilities and distributional networks as well as from
jointly undertaking research and development. Beyond this, the venture
benefited from the upswing of the US-business cycle at that time.
The Siemens AG corporate executive committee approved the acquisition of
Sylvania and provided financial support to Osram in terms of mcreasing
OSI's equity capital to nearly fourfold from 260 mill. DM to 1.07 bill. DM.
These funds have been made available under the condition that OSI shall not
draw further on Siemens' resources and shall sustain itself after a transition
period of approximately two years. For further investments in the years to
come Osram assigned 220-230 mill. DM to its US-affiliate which account
for more than half of its overall investment budget (400 mill. DM).-37-
• At OSI a tough restructuring program was carried through: the company had
to reduce the number of hierarchical levels, close down five out of 29 manu-
facturing plants as well as three administration offices and had to dismiss
1 700 out of 14 200 employees. Osram decided to leave the former Sylvania
management in place as this made it easier to achieve the consent of the
staff. So far, OSI has developed successfully and has passed the break-even
point even one year earlier than initially planned.
• The US is an attractive market place to expand a company's operational
base and also assumes an important role for relocating production lines
which became unprofitable at their former site, like e.g. manufacturing of
intermediate products in Germany (Berlin, Schwabmunchen). In the US, la-
bour costs — incl. non-wage labour costs — are only half of those in west-
ern Germany. Thus, OSI can profitably operate with machines of 22-year-
average — in contrast to its mother company, Osram, whose machines are
only five years old on average and whose higher productivity has to make up
for higher German labour costs.
o Restructuring success and consolidation in the US gained Osram the neces-
sary edge to continue expansion in Asia. So far Osram's sales in that region,
including India, have amounted to only 350 to 400 mill. DM annually. Os--38-
ram defines its goal for the Asian markets as to let sales in this region grow
faster than average sales of the Siemens AG. Within the five years to come,
sales in the Asian market shall be raised fivefold.
• Expansion in Asia is obviously well under way. A first production joint
venture in China has been set up, with Osram holding the majority while the
largest Chinese lamp manufacturer, together with a Chinese trading house
holding minority shares. In India, Osram is running a joint venture with the
second largest lamp manufacturer while in South Korea the company is even
acting as the market leader. Vietnam is the next market envisaged for further
expanding Osram's presence in Asia.
• In Eastern Europe Osram had reflections to set up a production joint venture
together with or by acquiring Tesla Holesovice, the largest Czech manufac-
turer of lightning equipment. Osram considers the east European market
place a suitable place for those productions which are too cost-intensive
elsewhere. Beyond production, Osram's sales activities, too, seem to be de-
veloping quite well in Central East Europe.-39-
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